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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the signing of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES or the Con-
vention),l many factors have inhibited its effective operation. Two 
particularly problematic issues arise due to the Parties' ability to 
take reservations from the Convention regarding individual species 
and from uncertainties in determining what constitutes a "pre-Con-
vention specimen." The controversial movement to prohibit trade in 
the ivory of the African elephants (Loxodonta africana) highlighted 
the problems associated with these elements of CITES' application. 
After a rancorous debate before and during the Seventh Meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in October 1989, an 
overwhelming majority of the Parties present at the Conference 
voted to provide the African elephant with the greatest protections 
available under the treaty.2 The Conference intended to impose a 
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The authors would like to thank James Martin.Jones, World Wide Fund for Nature (U.K.); 
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1 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 
3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. 
2 Doc. Plen. 7.4, at 1, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 
(1989). The vote was 76 in favor, 11 against, with 4 abstaining. [d. 
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worldwide ban on trade in African elephant ivory, but this important 
protectionist measure may be defeated by the operation of the two 
thorns in the side of the treaty mentioned above. 
Prior to the effective date of the ivory ban, a number of Parties 
actively involved in the ivory trade entered reservations as to the 
listing of the African elephant on Appendix I of CITES. Their con-
tinuation of the trade already has undermined the absolute ban. 3 
Disagreements about the meaning of the term "pre-Convention" 
brought about some of the controversy leading up to the Seventh 
Meeting of the Conference. A previous decision of the Conference 
of the Parties has removed at least some of the uncertainty over the 
meaning of the term, but Singapore is utilizing an exemption for 
pre-Convention specimens to limit the ivory affected by the ban to 
that which it acquired after joining CITES in 1986.4 This episode 
has demonstrated the difficulties and pinpointed further complexities 
in the operation of CITES. 
With respect to both of these problematic issues, public interest 
non-governmental organizations (PINGOs) have played, and con-
tinue to play, a critical role in the decision-making process of CITES. 
After calling for the establishment of such a Convention in the first 
place,5 PINGOs have now taken on the role of guardians of the spirit 
and purpose of CITES by monitoring both compliance and enforce-
ment. As this Article outlines, they ensured that specious legal 
arguments against the ivory ban were not allowed to take root and 
responded to Party reservations both legally and publicly. 
II. THE CITES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
called in 1963 for an international convention to regulate trade in 
threatened species.6 After ten years of work toward this goal by the 
IUCN and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
twenty-one countries signed CITES on March 3, 1973. 7 There are 
3 See, e.g., McCarthy, Britain Accused of'Stab in the Back' Over Ivory, The Times (London), 
Feb. 22, 1990, Home News, at 1, col. 3. 
4 See Singapore to Ban Ivory Trade, Reuters wire, Jan. 16, 1990 (available on Lexis); Ivory 
Import, Export to be Banned in Singapore, Xinhua General Overseas News Service wire, 
Jan. 16, 1990 (available on Lexis); see infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
6 S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 239 (1985). 
7 Id. CITES entered into force on July 1, 1975, after the requisite tenth signatory deposited 
an instrument of ratification. Id. at 240. 
1990] CITES IVORY BAN 801 
now 103 Parties to CITES8 and tens of thousands of species of plants 
and animals subject to its regulations. 9 The regime that CITES 
established serves both a controlling or limiting function as to trade 
of endangered species, and an informational function to keep track 
of their status. 
A. The CITES Secretariat and NGO Participation 
A permanent Secretariat located in Lausanne, Switzerland over-
sees the CITES system. lO In addition to its general regulatory du-
ties,l1 the Secretariat convenes regular and extraordinary meetings 
of the "Conference of the Parties. "12 The Conference of the Parties 
meets every two years to consider and adopt amendments to Ap-
pendices I and II, to review the progress of restoration and conser-
vation of listed species, and to make recommendations for improving 
the effectiveness of the Convention. 13 
At the discretion of the CITES Secretary General, the Secretariat 
may seek assistance from "suitable inter-governmental or non-gov-
ernmental international or national agencies and bodies technically 
qualified in protection, conservation and management of wild fauna 
and flora. "14 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with such qual-
ifications also may participate as observers in the meetings of the 
Conference, although they cannot cast votes. 15 As this Article sug-
gests, NGOs have made significant contributions to the operation of 
CITES in both contexts. 16 
8 United Nations Environment Programme, REGISTER OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND 
OTHER AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENT, UNEP/GC.15/Inf. 2, at 117-19 (1989). 
9 See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 244-46 (Appendix I contains approximately 900 species, 
Appendix III contains only 150, and Appendix II contains the bulk of listed species). 
10 CITES, supra note 1, art. XII. The Secretariat was originally funded by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), but the Parties themselves now contribute to its 
budget. See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 270, 273 & n.110. It consists of a Secretary General, 
three full-time conservation professionals, and three full-time secretaries, as well as part-time 
staff and consultants. Id. at 270. 
11 The Secretariat's duties are set out in Article XII(2)(a)-(i). 
12 See CITES, supra note 1, art. XI(2). 
131d. art. XI(3)(b)-(c), (e). The Conference also approves the CITES Secretariat's budget 
and considers any reports presented by the Secretariat or any Party. Id. art. XI(3)(a), (d). 
14 I d. art. XII(I). 
151d. art. XI(7) (NGOs may be refused admittance, however, upon the objection of at least 
one-third of the Parties present). 
16 See Kosloff & Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: 
Enforcement Theory and Practice in the United States, 5 B. U. INT'L L.J. 327, 335-36 (1987) 
(discussing the extensive participation and contributions of NGOs in CITES implementation). 
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B. Operative Provisions 
CITES regulation stems from listing a species within one of its 
three appendices, and the level of protection afforded depends upon 
the appendix.17 Appendix I includes "all species threatened with 
extinction which are or may be affected by trade. "18 Except in very 
limited circumstances, CITES prohibits all trade in Appendix I spe-
cies. 19 Any trade that occurs cannot be "detrimental to the survival 
of the species,''20 and must not be for "primarily commercial pur-
poses. ''21 Dependent upon these and other inquiries, CITES Article 
III requires both the exporting and importing Parties to issue per-
mits for proposed trade in Appendix I specimens. 22 
Appendix II lists "all species which although not necessarily now 
threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens 
of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utili-
zation incompatible with their survival."23 CITES allows commercial 
trade in Appendix II specimens if it is not "detrimental to the 
survival of the species."24 No import permit is required, but the 
importer must present an export permit or re-export certificate 
before entry is allowed.25 Otherwise, the conditions on trade in Ap-
pendix II specimens are similar to those for Appendix I specimens. 26 
Appendix III includes "all species which any Party identifies as 
being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purposes 
of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the coop-
eration of other Parties in the control of trade. ''27 This last appendix 
provides an opportunity for Parties to assist each other in enforcing 
their domestic wildlife legislation.28 The management authority of 
17 See S. LYSTER, suprt) note 1, at 240-41. 
18 CITES, ISUpra note 1, art. II(l). 
19 I d. art. III. 
IIl/d. art. III(2)(a). This determination is made by a scientific authority in the State of 
export. Id. According to CITES Article IX, each Party must designate one or more "Scientific 
Authorities" to determine the consequences of import/export transactions and one or more 
"J4&nagement Authorities" to grant trade permits. 
tl Id. art. III(3)(c) (determination made by the management authority of the importing 
State). 
'= Id. art. II1(2)-(3). 
a Id. art. 11(2). Article II(2)(b) provides that species similar in appearance to Appendix II 
iIJIilcles also must be. subject to regulation if necessary to effectively regulate an Appendix II 
species. See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 244. 
~ CITES, ISUpra note 1. art. IV(2)(a). 
2Ii See id. art. IV(4). 
III See id. art. IV(2)-.(7). 
7T Id. art. 11(3). 
l1B Id. art. V; see al80 Chopra, Introduction: Convention on International TradA3 in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fllww and Flora, 5 B. U. INT'L L.J. 225, 226 (1987). 
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the exporting state must issue an export permit for Appendix III 
specimens based upon somewhat less stringent standards than those 
for Appendix I and II species. 29 
Perhaps the most important duty of the Conference of the Parties 
is to consider and adopt amendments to Appendices I and II.30 
Article XV sets out the basic principles for amending these append-
ices to include or remove species and to move species from one 
appendix to the other. At the First Meeting of the Conference of 
the Parties held in Berne, Switzerland, however, the Parties devel-
oped and adopted more detailed criteria for listing and de-listing 
species.31 The so-called "Berne criteria" continue to dictate the stan-
dards for judging amendment proposals. 32 These criteria most often 
are thought to be controversial because of their rather protectionist 
requirements for removing or downlisting species,33 although oppo-
nents to the uplisting of the Mrican elephant to Appendix I argued 
that it did not meet the Berne criteria for threatened extinction "at 
the species level."34 Amendments are adopted by a two-thirds ma-
jority vote of the Parties present and voting,35 and enter into force 
ninety days after the meeting where a vote takes place.36 
C. Exemption Provisions 
CITES incorporates two provisions that allow Parties to bypass 
the regulations applicable to particular species listed in the append-
ices. First, Article VII(2) of CITES provides that, when a manage-
ment authority of a State of export or re-export determines that a 
29 See CITES, supra note 1, art. V(2). 
30 See id. art. XI(3). 
31 See Conf. 1.1, at 31, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF 
THE PARTIES (1976); see also S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 243. 
32 Id. 
33 See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 243. 
34 See CITES Secretariat, Views of the CITES Secretariat on Potential Problems Raised 
by the Inclusion of the African Elephant on Appendix I, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH 
MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1989) [hereinafter CITES Secretariat, Views 
of the CITES Secretariat]; D. Harland, Jumping on the 'Ban-Wagon': Efforts to Save the 
African Elephant (Feb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript). This argument seems to rely on the 
existence of large, well-managed stocks of elephants in several southern African nations. 
Given the fact that healthy herds of elephants exist in some places, so the argument goes, it 
does not matter that the species may be extinguished elsewhere. The Conference of the 
Parties rejected this argument upon its vote to move the African elephant from Appendix II 
to Appendix I by a vote of 76 to 11, with 4 abstentions. Doc. Plen. 7.4, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1989). 
35 CITES, supra note 1, art. XV(I)(b). The term "Parties present and voting" is defined as 
those Parties at the meeting who cast an affirmative or negative vote, and abstaining Parties 
are not counted in the two-thirds necessary for adoption. Id. 
36 Id. art. XV(I)(c). 
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specimen "was acquired before the provisions of the present Con-
vention applied to that specimen," the provisions of Articles III, IV, 
and V do not apply.37 The exporting State's Management Authority 
issues a "pre-Convention specimen" certificate upon making such a 
determination so that the specimen may be traded. 38 
This section effectively exempts "pre-Convention specimens" from 
the restrictions relating to a listing on Appendix I, II, or III, notably 
regarding permits. One of the objectives of Article VII(2) was to 
allow stockholders to trade their existing stocks before the Conven-
tion originally entered into force,39 as well as permitting stockholders 
to trade in old or antique specimens other than personal effects.40 In 
practice, however, traders have abused this provision by stockpiling 
large quantities of specimens that soon may be listed in the append-
ices or uplisted to a higher level of protections. 41 
Second, CITES permits Parties to take reservations from the 
Convention as to particular listed species either at the time of that 
Party's ratification42 or upon amendment to an appendix.43 In the 
case of additions to Appendices I and II, a reserving Party has 
ninety days after the amendment to register its reservation with 
Switzerland, the "Depository Government, "44 whereas reservations 
to Appendix III listings may be taken at any time. 45 Reserving 
Parties are treated as non-Parties with regard to trade in the des-
ignated species or its parts or derivatives,46 which allows them to 
trade with actual non-Parties and other Parties taking matching 
reservations unfettered by CITES requirements. 47 
37Id. art. VII(2). 
38 See id. 
39 See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 257. 
40 As to "personal effects" see CITES, supra note 1, art. VII(3); S. LYSTER, supra note 6, 
at 258-59. 
41 See T. INSKIPP & S. WELLS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE 23 (1979); Note, 
Regulation of International Trade in Endangered Wildlife, 1 B.U. INTL L.J. 249, 257-58 
(1982) (suggesting eliminating the Article VII(2) exemption because of abuses even though 
traders will suffer some economic harm). 
42 CITES, supra note 1, art. XXIII(2). 
43 Id. arts. XV(3) (Appendix I and II species); XVI(2) (Appendix III species). 
44 Id. art. XV(3) . 
.. Id. art. XVI(2). 
46 Id. arts. XV(3); XVI(2); and XXIII(3). 
47 See Note, Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention: Reservations 
Regarding the Reservations Clauses, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 438 (1981). Article X of 
CITES imposes requirements on trade between Parties and non-Parties such as "comparable 
documentation issued by the competent authorities" in the non-Party state, which "substan-
tially conforms" with CITES requirements. This provision also applies to trade between 
reserving Parties and non-reserving Parties for trade in Appendices II and III specimens, 
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The reservation clauses seem contradictory to the general goals 
of CITES and their operation can cause seriously detrimental effects 
on listed endangered species. 48 While noting that the drafters of 
CITES probably included the reservation clauses to encourage 
greater State participation, one commentator suggests that the 
drafters envisioned that the reservations would be used infre-
quently.49 Neither the number of Parties utilizing the clauses nor 
the quantity of reservations taken have proven to be small. 50 
Determining the effect of a reservation to an amendment uplisting 
a species from Appendix II to Appendix I has presented a persistent 
problem in CITES enforcement. 51 According to a literal reading of 
the Convention, a reserving Party that was following the strict 
requirements applicable to trade of Appendix II specimens prior to 
an uplisting becomes almost completely unregulated after amend-
ment. 52 France embraced this interpretation in 1979 when it took 
reservations to the uplisting of most populations of saltwater croc-
odiles and stated that its trade in such specimens thereafter would 
be outside the scope of the Convention. 53 In response to this flaw in 
CITES regulation, the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties recommended that Parties taking reservations on transfers 
from Appendix II to Appendix I should continue to follow the re-
quirements for trade in Appendix II specimens. 54 
but, at the Third Meeting of the Conference, the Parties banned all commercial trade in 
Appendix I specimens between reserving and non-reserving Parties. Id. at 437 & n.66 (citing 
Doc. 3.22, at 7, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE 
PARTIES (1981». 
48 See McFadden, Asian Compliance with CITES: Problems and Prospects, 5 B. U. INT'L 
L.J. 311, 321 (1987). 
49 See Note, supra note 47, at 436-37. The author refers to a very early commentator who 
believed that the public nature of the reservations and the '''weight of international opinion'" 
would limit their use. Id. at 437 (quoting Legislative Development: Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species o/Wild Fauna and Flora, 6 L. & POL'y Bus. 1211, 1227 
(1974». 
50 See, e.g., S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 262-64 (discussing French, Italian, Japanese, and 
Indonesian reservations); McFadden, supra note 48, at 314,321 (noting that as of 1987, Japan 
had entered 14 reservations just on Appendix I species). 
51 See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 263-64; Note, supra note 47, at 435-36. 
52 See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 263-64. 
63 Id. at 264. Lyster points out that a less-endangered population of the crocodiles remained 
on Appendix II and France continued to follow those procedures. The "absurd" result was 
that the more endangered crocodiles were not protected while the safer popUlation was. Id. 
Fortunately, effective January 1, 1984, all members of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) were required to withdraw all CITES reservations pursuant to the European Com-
mission Regulation implementing CITES in the EEC. See Commission Regulation No. 3626/ 
82, O.J. L 384/31 (1982). 
54 See Conf. 4.25, at 81, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE 
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It is in the context of this background to CITES that we consider 
its application regarding the African elephant and the uplisting of 
that species from Appendix II to Appendix I. First, however, it is 
informative to review the status of the elephant in Africa and the 
depredations it has suffered. 
III. THE DECLINE OF THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT 
Elephants have been hunted for thousands of years to obtain their 
prized ivory tusks, but the last decade alone saw a halving of the 
African elephant population. 55 Approximately 675,000 African ele-
phants died during the 1980s, killed primarily by poachers who use 
assault rifles to gun down whole families of elephants often from 
jeeps and helicopters. 56 Soaring ivory prices and consistent demand 
urged on this illegal trade, 57 which constituted up to eighty percent 
of the overall world ivory trade in the last ten to fifteen years. 58 
The poachers and their dealers have developed elaborate smug-
gling routes through willing African nations like Burundi, which has 
no elephant population of its own but still traded hundreds of tons 
of raw ivory a year. 59 From Africa, the ivory makes its way into the 
Far East through Singapore or Japan.60 Hong Kong was the largest 
importer of raw ivory, and one commentator has suggested that its 
customs officials have routinely allowed shipments based on forged 
or incomplete documentation. 61 
OF THE PARTIES (1983). The Gaborone, Botswana Conference also requested that all types of 
reserving Parties keep and report trading statistics for species under reservations so that the 
monitoring function of CITES at least could be maintained. Id. 
66 See Gup, Trail of Shame, TIME, Oct. 16, 1989, at 66. 
56 See id. at 68; Netter, Ivory Quotas Reduce Poaching of Elephants, N.Y. Times, May 27, 
1986, at C4, col. 5. 
67 Open Letter from Conservation, Environment, and Animal Protection NGOs to the 
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (Oct. 16, 1989) (rising 
demand has increased ivory prices by up to 300% in various markets). 
68 See Gup, supra note 55, at 68 ("In the 1970s ivory was a hedge against inflation, stockpiled 
and traded like bullion."); Note, Wildlife in the Third World: Current Efforts to Integrate 
Conservation with Development, 5 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 83,94 (1984) (ivory price in 1970 
was US $2.30/lb., and in 1984 it was US $34.00/lb.). 
69 See Gup, supra note 55, at 68-69. 
60 See generally S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 271 (noting that in 1979 the Secretariat 
discovered that South Africa reported exporting a total of 300 kilograms of elephant ivory to 
Hong Kong during a six-month period, while Hong Kong reported imports of 16,300 kilograms 
from that country for the same period, suggesting that South Africa was being used to 
"launder" ivory poached in other countries); McFadden, supra note 48, at 313-19 (describing 
illegal trade in the Far East); Note, Regulation of International Trade in Endangered 
Wildlife, 1 B. U. INT'L L.J. 249, 261 (1982) (explaining smuggling operations between Africa 
and Singapore). 
61 McFadden, supra note 48, at 318. 
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Ghana listed the Mrican elephant on Appendix IlIon February 
26, 197662 and the Conference uplisted the species to Appendix II in 
1978.63 At the request of several African nations, the Parties estab-
lished a system of export quotas in 198564 and importing Parties 
tightened controls in conjunction with that move. 65 The export quo-
tas were set too high to provide the elephants significant protection, 
however.66 Also in 1985, the CITES Secretariat agreed to register 
undocumented and probably illegal stockpiles held in countries such 
as Singapore and Burundi as a precondition for their joining the 
Convention and following its trade requirements.67 By this act, the 
Secretariat legitimized a vast quantity of suspect raw ivory, which 
then quadrupled in price and was traded free of any stigma.68 The 
Appendix II listing and the additional step of establishing quotas did 
little damage to the widespread illicit trade,69 and the registration 
of poached stockpiles only escalated its profit. 
. Central African nations, the countries affected most severely by 
poaching,70 virtually declared war on poachers in 1989 and committed 
greater resources to range and wildlife management.71 Their ex-
treme measures began to have positive results, but could not stem 
the tide. By the summer of 1989, the ivory trade had so decimated 
the African elephant populations72 that the largest importing coun-
tries succumbed to public pressure and adopted domestic import 
moratoria or at least harsh restrictions. The United States, the 
62 CITES Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment of Resolution Conf. 5.11, Doc. 7.43.2, at 
para. 2, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENnI MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 
(1989) [hereinafter CITES Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment]. 
63 Interview with James Martin.Jones, Conservation Officer (International), World Wide 
Fund for Nature, United Kingdom, in London, England (Apr. 2, 1990). 
64 See CITES, supm note 1, art. IV(3). This section provides that Management Authorities 
may set limits on export permits when a Scientific Authority determines that such measures 
are necessary "to maintain that species throughout its range at a level consistent with its role 
in the ecosystems in which it occurs and well above the level at which that species might 
become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I." [d. 
66 See Netter, supra note 56, at C4, col. 5. 
66 [d. (the export quota for all of Africa was set at 90,000 tusks or 45,000 elephants). 
67 See id. at C4, col. 6; Gup, supra note 37, at 69. 
Oil Gup, supra note 55, at 69. 
69 See Amendments to Appendices [and II oftlw Convention: Proposal oftM Govemmenl 
of Kenya, at 29a, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENnI MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF TIll 
PARTIES (1989). 
'11) See Gup, supra note 55, at 69 (Between 1979 and 1987 Tanzania's elephant population 
plummeted from nearly 316,000 to 85,000); Perlez, Can He Save tlw Eleplwnts?, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 7, 1990, Magazine, at 29, col. 3 (Kenya's elephant population dropped from 65,000 in 1980 
to 18,000 in 1990 even though all ivory trade was outlawed in Kenya in 1978). 
71 See generally Gup, supm note 55, at 67; Perlez, 8Upm note 47, at 29, col. 3. 
'12 United Nations Environment Programme, THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT 9 (1989). 
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European Community, Japan, and Hong Kong each adopted some 
form of import moratorium. 73 To culminate the activities of the sum-
mer of 1989, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya held a public 
burning of twelve tons of confiscated tusks74 to demonstrate his 
country's commitment to banning all trade in ivory. 
IV. THE SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES-OCTOBER 1989 
The Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES 
was held in Lausanne, Switzerland, in October, 1989. One of the 
major tasks for the Conference was to decide whether to move the 
African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I because of the 
downward spiral of the species' numbers. 75 
The elephant issue was particularly controversial for at least two 
reasons. First, a number of Southern African countries took the 
view that uplisting the African elephant to Appendix I, thereby 
establishing a ban on any international trade, would remove a major 
incentive to the effective management of their own healthy elephant 
populations. 76 Moreover, it would deprive them of much needed for-
eign currency from the sale of ivory produced by their well-managed 
stocks. 77 Second, a number of countries in which large, unsold stock-
piles of ivory were held attacked the legality of the proposed ban. 78 
They claimed that a ban on international trade in ivory that prohib-
ited the sale of such stockpiles would amount to the retroactive 
application of law, or alternately an interference with the legitimate 
expectations of stockpile holders to be able to trade their stocks. 79 
It is with the second argument that this Article is concerned. The 
claims as to "retroactivity" or "legitimate expectation," at least on 
73 See European Community Bans Imports of Ivory, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989,at 3, col. 
4; Japan Bans Some Ivory Imports, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 18, 1989, at 4, col. 1.; U.S. 
Trying to Protect Elephants, Declares Ban on All Ivory Imports, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, 
at A18, col. 1. 
74 Perlez, Kenya, Pressing for World Ban, Burns Its Stockpile of Ivory to Protect the 
Elephant, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1989, at A4, col. 1. 
75 See supra notes 3<h'J6 and accompanying text. 
76 See Elephants and Ivory Trade in Southern Africa, Doc. 7.43.4, at 7, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1989); Embassy of South 
Africa, ELEPHANT CONSERVATION AND THE PROPOSED BAN ON IVORY TRADE 2 (1989); Perlez, 
supra note 70, at 30, col. 2. 
77 See Perlez, supra note 47, at 30, col. 2; Ban on Ivory Takes Effect; Some Nations to Defy 
It, L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at All, col. 6. 
78 Interview with James Martin..Jones, Conservation Officer (International), World Wide 
Fund for Nature, United Kingdom, in London, England (Apr. 2, 1990). 
79 Id. 
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their face, raised important and perhaps complex issues of interna-
tionallaw with which CITES did not, and still does not, expressly 
deal. The arguments brought up questions about the content and 
effect of general principles of lawo and demonstrated the crucial role 
of public interest non-governmental organizations (PINGOs) both in 
decision making by the Conference and in the application of CITES. 81 
A. Stockpiles 
As has been suggested above, the question of stockpiles has long 
haunted the effective application of CITES.82 The wording of Article 
VII(2), which was intended in part to deal with such stockpiles, does 
not provide clear guidance as to the meaning of "pre-Convention 
specimens" or when a specimen is "acquired" for purposes of the 
Convention.83 As one commentator has written: "If X species was 
listed in Appendix I in 1977 and Y State acceded to CITES in 1982, 
does the Convention apply to a specimen of X species which was 
acquired in Y State in 1980?"84 Moreover, Article VII(2) does not 
answer definitively the question of when the Convention applies to 
a given specimen, and how that issue is influenced by the transfer 
of a species from one appendix to another, or by the deletion of a 
species from the appendices. The interpretation of Article VII(2) 
has caused difficulties for the Conference of the Parties for many 
years. 
In 1983, the Fourth Conference of the Parties, in Gaborone, Bot-
swana, recommended that each Party to the Convention determine 
for itself the proper interpretation of Article VII(2).85 This unsatis-
factory recommendation did not assist in providing a uniform inter-
pretation, and created the potential for further misunderstandings 
and abuses. Accordingly, in 1985, in the light of "serious difficulties" 
concerning the varying interpretation of Article VII(2), the Fifth 
Conference of the Parties revoked Conference Resolution 4.11 and 
adopted Conference Resolution 5.11 on the "Definition of the Term 
'Pre-Convention Specimen. "'86 
80 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 
1031, 39 AJIL Supp. 215n. 
81 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
82 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
83 See supra notes 37 and accompanying text. 
84 S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 257. 
85 See Conf. Res. 4.11, at 55-56, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE 
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1983). 
86 Conf. Res. 5.11, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE 
PARTIES (1985) [hereinafter Conf. Res. 5.11]. 
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Conference Resolution 5.11 attempts to address three issues. 
First, it establishes how and when a specimen is acquired. 87 Second, 
Resolution 5.11 determines when the Convention applies to a given 
specimen and how that will be influenced by the transfer of a species 
from one appendix to another or by the deletion of a species from 
an appendix.88 Third, it prescribes how to address the failure of 
Article VII(2) to provide responsibilities for importing countries in 
its implementation. 89 
As to the first issue, Conference Resolution 5.11 provides that the 
date on which a specimen is acquired is: 
i.) for live and dead animals or plants taken from the wild: the 
date of their initial removal from this habitat; or 
ii.) for parts and derivatives: the date of their introduction to 
personal possession, whichever date is earliest. 90 
As to the second and third issues, Conference Resolution 5.11 pro-
vides in relevant part: 
b) that the certificate referred to in Article VII, paragraph 2, 
only be issued by a Management Authority of an exporting coun-
try where it is satisfied that at the date on which a specimen 
was acquired: 
-the species involved was not listed in one of the Convention 
appendices; or 
-its country was not a Party to the Convention; or 
-the specimen concerned was subject to a reservation entered 
by its country with regard to the species involved; 
h) that in the case of a species uplisted, i.e. from Appendix III 
to II or I, or downlisted from Appendix I to II or III specimens 
concerned shall be subject to the provisions applicable to them 
at the time of export, re-export or import . . . .91 
Paragraph (d) of Conference Resolution 5.11 is also important to 
the application of the Resolution. It provides that an importing Party 
may only accept a pre-Convention certificate issued by another Party 
if the specimen was acquired prior to the date upon which the 
Convention entered into force regarding that specimen in the coun-
try of import. 92 The combined effects of paragraphs (a), (b), (d), and 
(h) is to prohibit trade in existing stocks of specimens uplisted from 
87 [d. at 52, para. (a). 
88 [d. at 53, para. (b). 
89 [d. para. (h). 
90 [d. at 52, para. (a). 
91 [d. at 53, paras. (a), (h). 
92 [d. para. (d); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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Appendix II or III to Appendix I from the date upon which the 
Appendix I listing comes into force. 
Conference Resolution 5.11 as a whole was adopted by fifty votes 
in favor to one against after extensive discussions regarding rec-
ommendation (h).93 The United States delegation proposed the final 
wording of 5. l1(h), which was supported by thirty-seven votes in 
favor with three against. 94 These high margins in favor of the Res-
olution can be seen as a sign of the Parties' strong commitment to 
their interpretation of Article VII(2). 
During 1988 and 1989 there was increased pressure to uplist the 
African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I. The document 
prepared by the CITES Secretariat and submitted to the Seventh 
Meeting of the Conference95 noted that the CITES African Elephant 
Working Group (AEWG) held its second meeting in Gaborone in July 
1989.96 The AEWG carried on substantial discussions regarding the 
sale of existing ivory stocks, either in Africa or consumer countries, 
in the event of such an uplisting to Appendix I. 97 
The AEWG took the view that the effect of applying Conference 
Resolution 5.11(h)to the African elephant once listed on Appendix. 
I would be to restrict legal trade in ivory to pre-Convention speci-
mens. 98 In this case, such specimens would be those acquired before 
the African elephant was listed for the first time in the CITES 
appendices on February 26, 1976, when it was listed by Ghana on 
Appendix 111.99 Within the AEWG, a dispute arose as to the effec-
tiveness of such an application of Conference Resolution 5. l1(h): 
While some considered that the implementation of Resolution 
Conf. 5.11, recommendation (h), would prevent the accumulation 
of new ivory stocks between the time of discussions and the date 
of entry into force of the listing in Appendix I, some others 
considered such an implementation unfair because stocks had 
already been established of ivory acquired in full compliance with 
CITES regulations. 1oo 
93 Doc. Plen. 5.7, section XIII 11, at 115-16, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF 
THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1985). 
94 Id. at 116. Prior to the vote, the observer from the IUCN stated that the resolution as 
it was later adopted would have considerable conservation benefits. Id. 
96 CITES Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment, supra note 62. 
96 Id. at 1, para. 1. 
9'1Id. 
98 Id., para. 2. 
99 Id. 
100 Id., para. 3. 
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It is in this context that the claims as to "retroactivity" and, implic-
itly, breach of "legitimate expectation" were made in respect of 
Conference Resolution 5.11(h).101 The CITES Secretariat document 
states: 
The legality of Resolution Conf. 5.11, recommendation (h), 
was also contested by some speakers as it implies a retroactive 
implementation of a legal text. 
Although no review of the situation has been made, it does 
not seem likely that many Parties are in a position to implement 
this particular recommendation. 102 
By noting the unlikelihood of the implementation of 5.11(h) by many 
Parties immediately after mentioning the implied retroactivity of the 
provision, the CITES Secretariat seemed tacitly to fuel, and sup-
port, the retroactivity argument. 
This view was supported further by the Secretariat document's 
suggestion of two ways in which Conference Resolution 5. 11 (h) could 
be amended. The Secretariat's first option was to revert to an earlier 
draft of 5.11(h).103 A second option proffered was to amend paragraph 
(h) to exclude ivory, "taking into consideration the large volume of 
stockpiled ivory in producer and consumer countries. "104 
B. The Legal Issues 
The Secretariat's move to rewrite Conference Resolution 5.11(h) 
or to exclude ivory was countered, in part, by a group of public 
interest non-governmental organizations, using both political and 
legal approaches. With regard to legal mechanisms, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) obtained and circulated an independent 
101 Id., para. 4. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 2, para. 6. The alternative draft of Conf. Res. 5. l1(h) read as follows: 
[The Conference of the Parties recommends] that specimens which were acquired in 
compliance with the laws on the protection of fauna and flora and before the date of 
entry into force of the transfer of the species involved from one appendix to another 
be treated as follows: 
-in the case of a species uplisted, i.e. from Appendix III to II or I, or from Appendix 
II to I, the specimens concerned shall remain subject to the provisions 
applicable to them at the date of acquisition; 
-in the case of a species downlisted, i.e. from Appendix I to II or III, or where the 
species is deleted from the appendices, the specimens concerned shall be 
subject to the provisions applicable to them at the time of export, re-export 
or import. 
Id. The Conference of the Parties rejected the position taken in this alternative draft when 
the U.S. draft of Conf. Res. 5.11 was adopted. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
104 CITES Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment, supra note 62, at 2, para. 7. 
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formal legal opinion (WWF Legal Opinion) that dealt with the issues 
of retroactivity and legitimate expectations, as well as the ability of 
the Fifth Conference to interpret Article VII(2) as it had done in 
Conference Resolution 5.11, especially at paragraph (h).105 This was 
not the first time that an independent legal opinion written by a 
PINGO had been used in the CITES context. Opinions of the IUCN's 
environmental law center have regularly been sought by the CITES 
Secretariat,l06 and in 1986 several countries made use of an indepen-
dent legal interpretation in a dispute relating to Article XIV of 
CITES. 107 
1. Retroactivity 
Prior to and during the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties, ivory stockholders and some governments <;laimed that the 
uplisting of African elephants to Appendix I together with the ap-
plication of Conference Resolution 5.11 would amount to a retroac-
tive application of law. The argument, which again appeared to be 
supported by the CITES Secretariat,108 seems to run as follows. The 
uplisting of the African elephant to Appendix I on October 18, 1989 
would result in a prohibition in the trade of all African elephant 
products ninety days later109 and would apply to specimens acquired 
on or after February 26, 1976 when the African elephant was first 
listed by Ghana on Appendix III. Accordingly, specimens acquired 
between February 26, 1976 and January 17, 1990 could no longer be 
traded, even though they had been "acquired in full compliance with 
CITES regulations. "110 The argument concludes that a retroactive 
application of the ban in trade would occur in respect of these spec-
imens. 
The argument as to retroactivity was intellectually incoherent and 
seriously flawed. It is not to the Secretariat's credit that it supported 
the argument, albeit implicitly. It fails to distinguish, as is necessary 
105 The legal opinion was drafted by James Cameron and Philippe Sands, who are both 
barristers and Directors of the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Kings 
College London, London University. This opinion is on file with the Boston College Environ-
mental Affairs Law Review. 
106 See, e.g., Doc. Plen. 5.7, supra note 93, at 115, para. 11. 
107 See CITES Secretariat, The Opinion of the IUCN Environmental Law Center, Doc. 
TEC 2.5, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (June 
23, 1986), cited in Thomsen & Brautigam, CITES in the European Economic Community: 
Who Benefits?, 5 B. U. INT'L L.J. 269, 277 n.41 (1987). 
lOB See CITES Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment, supra note 62, at 1, para. 4. 
109 See CITES, supra note 1, art. XV(3); see also supra notes 30--36 and accompanying text. 
110 See CITES Secretariat, Proposals for Amendment, supra note 62, at 1, para. 3. 
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for an understanding of the scheme and practice of CITES, between 
the lawfulness of acquisition, the lawfulness of possession, and the 
lawfulness of trade. 111 To make trade unlawful is not to make a prior 
acquisition or existing possession unlawful: uplisting the African 
elephant to Appendix I and prohibiting trade has no effect on the 
legality of a prior acquisition or indeed of a prior trade. 112 Uplisting 
to Appendix I would amount to a retroactive application of a prohib-
ition only if the effect was to make prior trade unlawful. Instead, 
the ban created a prospective prohibition to trading African elephant 
specimens after January 18, 1990. 113 
2. Legitimate expectation 
The argument as to legitimate expectation certainly has more 
substance than the retroactivity argument, but it too was considered 
in the WWF Legal Opinion to be ill-founded in the context of the 
debate relating to stockpiles of African elephant ivory. Essentially, 
traders, certain countries, and apparently the CITES Secretariat1l4 
took the view that ivory traders had stockpiled ivory in the legiti-
mate expectation that they could trade legally in those stocks. The 
central issue was whether stockpile holders and those who supported 
their argument were aware of the CITES regime: an expectation to 
trade in the future will only be legitimate if it is reasonable. The 
reasonableness of such a position is dubious because those seeking 
to rely on it had, or should have had, knowledge of the African 
elephant's listing in Appendix III or Appendix II at the time of their 
acquisitions of ivory. 
Analogies may be drawn from other areas of international legal 
practice to determine if stockpilers' expectations were legitimate. 
For example, in an analogous context, European Community law 
frequently has dealt with claims against the Commission of the Eu-
111 "Trade" is defined in CITES as "export, re-export or import and introduction from the 
sea." CITES, supra note 1, art. I(c). 
112 CITES' application is limited to international trade, so the ban does not prohibit selling 
ivory products domestically in Parties currently holding stocks. See CITES, supra note 1, 
art. I(c). 
113 A related question concerns the legal effect of Conf. Res. 5.11 itself. Conf. Res. 5.11 is 
an attempt to authoritatively interpret Article VII(2) to give effect to the "aims and spirit of 
the Convention." See Conf. Res. 5.11, supra note 86, Preamble. Article XI(3)(e) provides that 
the Conference may "make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the present 
Convention." It is an interesting question, however, whether a resolution of the Conference 
of the Parties containing an authoritative interpretation of a provision of CITES can be applied 
to specimens acquired prior to its adoption. Determining the legal status of a Conference 
resolution lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
114 See CITES Secretariat, Views of the CITES Secretariat, supra note 34. 
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rope an Communities on the basis that its imposition of sudden 
changes in the law have breached the principle of legitimate expec-
tation. One commentator on European Community law has reviewed 
a series of decisions by the European Court of Justice relating to 
Community laws that have caused bans on trade in particular prod-
uctS. 115 This commentator has suggested that the rule is that "one 
must ask whether a prudent dealer of reasonable knowledge and 
experience would have relied on the expectation; if he would not, 
the expectation is not legitimate. "116 
In the case of the ban on African elephant ivory, it would seem to 
be manifestly apparent that the whole scheme of CITES empowers 
the Conference of the Parties to move species from one appendix to 
another l17 with the effect that lawful trade may, after the Conference 
has taken the necessary decision, quite swiftly become unlawful 
trade. The CITES regime incorporates permit and other require-
ments for listed species,118 so that any person trading lawfully in a 
product that is then listed on Appendix II or Appendix III is pre-
sumably on notice that CITES regulates its trade. Traders also 
should be held to know that the conservation status of the specimens 
they trade may change, and that a Conference decision to uplist a 
species to Appendix I would prohibit all trade. Supporters of the 
legitimate expectation argument were relying on one aspect of 
CITES without regard for other provisions or the overall operation 
of the treaty. 
The legal opinion circulated by the WWF during the debate on 
the African elephant at the Seventh Conference of the Parties stated 
that there was "no force in the argument that traders that have 
stockpiled ivory have a legitimate expectation to trade in ivory 
following the uplifting of a species from Appendix II to Appendix 
1. "119 The record of the debate on Conference Resolution 5.11 
strengthened the WWF Legal Opinion. During the debate, the 
United States delegation expressed its opinion that an interpretation 
of the Convention like that subsequently adopted by the ivory ban 
opponents would "encourage excessive taking and stockpiling of spe-
cies for which there are uplisting proposals. "120 Moreover, Confer-
115 See T. HARTLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 143 (2d ed. 1988). 
116Id. See, e.g., Unions Nationales des Cooperatives Agricoles de Cereales, Cases 95-98/ 
74, 15, 100175, [1975] ECR 1615. 
117 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text. 
119 World Wide Fund for Nature, Opinion of Law Regarding CITES Article VII paragraph 
2 and Resolution 5.11 of the Conference of the Parties, at 5 (Oct. 10, 1989). 
12°Id. (quoting Doc. Com. 5.25, at 116, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE 
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1985». 
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ence Resolution 5. 11 (h) was supported by thirty-seven votes in favor 
with only three votes against. 121 
It seems clear, therefore, that in respect of ivory acquired after 
the first listing of the African elephant on Appendix III, in 1976,122 
the best that can be said for the legitimate expectation argument is 
that, while it might be of general relevance, it cannot be effective 
on the specific facts. Additionally, even if a legitimate expectation 
argument could be said to exist, a strong and effective counter-
argument could be made that the public interest of the international 
community of preserving the African elephant would outweigh the 
interest of a tiny group of stockpile holders. 
All Parties present at the Seventh Meeting of the Conference 
received a copy of the WWF Legal Opinion. As it turned out, there 
was no debate as to the retroactivity and legitimate expectation 
arguments on the floor of Committee I, which was the primary 
committee on the ivory ban, or at the Plenary session. When the 
vote was taken on the uplisting of the African elephant at the Ple-
nary, there were seventy-six Parties in favor of the Somalia draft 
amendment123 and eleven against, with four Parties abstaining. 124 
Ninety days later, on January 18, 1990, the amendment would enter 
into force. 
The effect of the WWF action of obtaining and circulating an 
independent legal opinion cannot be stated with certainty. It may 
be sufficient, however, to observe that following the circulation of 
the opinion the matter of retroactivity did not reappear as a signif-
icant issue. 
V. AFTER THE BAN-THE PRESENT SITUATION 
Upon news of the impending trade ban, ivory prices dropped 
dramatically around the world. 125 Dealers in Hong Kong and Burundi 
121 Doc. Plen. 5.7, supra note 93, at section XIII 11, at 116. 
122 See supra note 62. 
123 See SO'I1ULlia Amendment, Doc. 7.43.8, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF 
THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1989)'. The Somalia draft amendment was a slight vari-
ation of the United States of America's proposal, which incorporated a provision that the 
Conference would create a panel of experts ''to advise the Parties on requests for transfer of 
particular elephant populations back to Appendix II." I d.; see also Amendments to Appendices 
I and II of the Convention: Proposal of the Government of the United States of America, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (1989). 
124 Doc. Plen. 7.4, at 1, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE 
OF THE PARTIES (1989). 
126 See Jones, Hong Kong Ivory Industry Seeks Buyers as International Ban on Trade 
Nears, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1989, at B4A, col. 2 (dealers cutting prices by 30% to 40%); 
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desperately sought buyers for their huge stockpiles of raw ivory in 
an attempt to sell it before the CITES import ban took effect in 
countries accepting the amendment. 126 Hong Kong officials visited 
several consumer nations such as Japan seeking to convince them to 
make an exception to their domestic import bans for ivory from 
Hong Kong,127 and presumably to lobby them to enter reservations 
on the uplisting. Demand for ivory allegedly is falling off as fast as 
its prices,128 and as conservation groups are stepping up anti-ivory 
pUblicity and education campaigns worldwide. 
A. Reservations 
The legal saga of the attempt to save the African elephant by 
uplisting it to CITES Appendix I, however, did not end with count-
ing the overwhelming vote of the Conference to do so. On January 
17, 1990, shortly before the ninety-day period for entering reserva-
tions to the amendment had expired,129 the Government of the 
United Kingdom notified the Depository Government that: 
In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 
XV of the Convention, the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland hereby enter a reserva-
tion, on behalf of Hong Kong, with respect to the amendment of 
the Convention providing for the listing of the African elephant, 
Loxodonta Africana, on Appendix I of the Convention. 
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
North Ireland wish to make clear to the Government of the Swiss 
Confederation that this reservation will remain in force for a 
period of six months only from 18 January 1990, and that they 
will apply the Convention to the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland and to the British Dependent Terrr. 
tories with the sole exception of Hong Kong. The Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
also wish to make it clear that imports of ivory into Hong Kong 
have been, and will continue to be, prohibited and that only ivory 
currently held legally in Hong Kong will be permitted to be re-
exported during the period of the reservation. 130 
Perlez, Devaluing the Tusk, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, at 29, col. 1 ("dramatic drop in the 
world price of ivory"). 
126 See Jones, supra note 125, at B4A, col. 2; Perlez, Devaluing the Tusk, supra note 125, 
at 29, col. 1. 
127 See Jones, supra note 125, at B4A, col. 2. 
128 See Reprieve for the Giant of Beasts, TIME, Oct. 30, 1989, at 77. 
129 CITES, supra note 1, art. XV(3); see supra notes 35--36 and accompanying text. 
130 It should be noted that a literal reading of Article XV(3) suggests that, having entered 
a reservation in respect of Hong Kong, the United Kingdom is a Party that "shall be treated 
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The United Kingdom's reservation for Hong Kong was widely 
condemned131 as being likely to make effective enforcement of the 
prohibition on trade in African elephant ivory considerably more 
difficult.132 Mainland China, which is already one of Hong Kong's 
ivory trading partners and likely to become its biggest market, was 
the only ivory-consuming Party to take a reservation. 133 The five 
ivory-producing southern African nations that opposed the ban all 
entered reservations with the Depository Government. 134 Japan and 
the United States, previously the largest consumers of ivory, had 
unilaterally banned imports of ivory prior to the Seventh Conference 
and supported the uplisting amendment at Lausanne. 135 The Gov-
ernment of Singapore, however, has stated that it will apply the ban 
only to ivory acquired after 1986 when Singapore became a Party. 136 
B. PINGO Responses to the United Kingdom Reservation 
Given the makeup of potential trading partners, the Hong Kong 
reservation constitutes a significant blow to the effectiveness of the 
ban. 137 Although the reservation did not provoke widespread con-
as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to the species concerned." See 
supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding its stated intention to limit the 
reservation to Hong Kong, it would appear therefore that buyers in the United Kingdom 
could as a matter of CITES law import ivory from States not a Party or States taking 
matching reservations. This unhappy result clearly was not intended by the Government of 
the United Kingdom. 
131 See, e.g., McCarthy, Britain Accused of 'Stab in the Back' Over Ivory, The Times 
(London), Feb. 22, 1990, Home News, at 1, col. 3; French Animal Rights Campaigners 
Protest HK Reservation at British Embassy in Paris, Financial Times, Jan. 25, 1990, at 1, 
col. 1; Hong Kong Defends Ivory Ban Exception, UPI wire, Jan. 19, 1990 (available on Lexis). 
132 See S. LYSTER, supra note 6, at 263 ("In practice, ... reservations can be very damaging. 
Not only can reserving Parties trade freely with non-Parties, but reservations sometimes 
encourage trade to continue, albeit illegally, with other Parties."). 
133 Stevens, Britain Exempts Hong Kong from Ivory Ban, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1990, at 
C5, col. 1. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.; see also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text 
136 See Singapore to Ban Ivory Trade, Reuters wire, Jan. 16, 1990 (available on Lexis); 
Ivory Import, Export to be Banned in Singapore, Xinhua General Overseas News Service 
wire, Jan. 16, 1990 (available on Lexis). 
137 Hong Kong was the world's largest importer of ivory, but most of the end products were 
exported to ivory-consuming nations. See McFadden, supra note 48, at 318. Thus, with China 
and several other countries maintaining some level of demand for ivory products, the goal of 
the ivory ban to eliminate profitable trade will be undermined and poaching and smuggling 
will continue. See McCarthy, supra note 90, at 1, col. 3. Noted anthropologist Richard Leakey, 
now the Director of the Kenyan Wildlife Service, claimed that there was a direct link between 
the Hong Kong reservation and an upsurge in elephant killings between mid-January and 
mid-February, 1990. Thirty to fourty elephants died at the hands of poachers in Kenya alone 
during that period compared to a total of 60 for the previous six months. I d., col. 5. 
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demnation among the Parties to CITES, public interest non-govern-
mental organizations reacted strongly. For example, two leading 
PINGOs took different approaches to attacking the reservation in 
the media and legally. Once again, it appeared that PINGOs alone 
were prepared to act as guardians of the international environment 
by invoking and applying legal arguments and public discourse. 138 
In March 1990, the World Wide Fund for Nature announced its 
finding that approximately one-half of the 670 tons of raw ivory in 
Hong Kong is illegal or simply cannot be accounted for. 139 According 
to the WWF, the United Kingdom based the reservation on Hong 
Kong trade officials' assurances that they would impose strict con-
trols on ivory trade. 140 The WWF called for the United Kingdom to 
withdraw the reservation because its findings showed that Hong 
Kong was not meeting these standards. 141 
Greenpeace, another leading PINGO, has considered challenging 
the legality of the United Kingdom reservation for Hong Kong. The 
legality of the reservation can be considered according to English 
law, the law of the European Communities, general public interna-
tional law, and the law governing CITES. With regard to English 
law, the constitutional position is that Hong Kong is an overseas 
territory for whose international relations the United Kingdom is 
responsible. 142 Accordingly, when the United Kingdom ratified 
CITES on January 1, 1976,143 it entered a declaration that CITES 
was to apply to the Territory of Hong Kong as well. 144 The reser-
vation of January 17, 1990, therefore, can be considered according 
to English law. 
Under English administrative law, the question is whether enter-
ing the reservation in respect of Hong Kong amounted to a "mani-
festly unreasonable" exercise of administrative discretion. 145 Because 
138 See Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
393 (1989). For a discussion of environmental guardianship, see id. at 396-401; for a discussion 
of the role of NGOs in international law and expansion of that role by giving NGOs standing 
under general international law, see id. at 412-17. 
139 PR Newswire, Mar. 7, 1990 (available on Lexis). Only 53% of the 670 tons of ivory in 
Hong Kong has permits and can be traced to its point of origin. Id. The WWF was not the 
first to point out the inadequacies and corruption of Hong Kong's regulation of ivory trade. 
See, e.g., Gup, supra note 55, at 68; McFadden, supra note 48, at 318-19; Tightening Controls 
on the Ivory Trade in Japan, 19 ORYX No.2, at 3 (1985). 
140 PR Newswire, supra note 139. 
141Id. 
142 See 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Paras. 1027-29, 1163, 1200 (4th ed. 1974). 
143 See Note, supra note 41, at 257. 
144 McFadden, supra note 48, at 313. 
145 See 1 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Para. 62 (4th ed. 1973) (citing Associated Provin-
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the English courts always have taken a narrow view of what con-
stitutes an "unreasonable" administrative act,146 it is difficult to imag-
ine how this argument could succeed before them. Specifically, it 
would be necessary not only to argue that the reservation would 
establish a large gap in the enforcement of the CITES ban on inter-
national ivory trade, but also that this cost would be disproportionate 
to the benefit of protecting the Hong Kong stockpile holders from 
economic loss. In the context of the present difficulties in Hong Kong 
stemming from the transfer of control to the People's Republic of 
China in 1997,147 it is even less likely that an English court would 
consider the reservation unreasonable and strike it down. 
As to public international law, CITES expressly provides for res-
ervations apparently without limitations. 148 It seems difficult, there-
fore, to conceive how the United Kingdom reservation could be said 
to go beyond the permissible scope of Article XV(3), or the general 
rules of international law governing the permissibility of reserva-
tions. 149 
It is in the context of the European Communities' legal framework 
that the reservation might be in some difficulty. The Council of the 
European Communities adopted a regulation on the implementation 
of CITES in the Communities. 150 The operational articles of the 
Council Regulation entered into force on January 1, 1984. 151 Accord-
ingly, CITES is part of Community law and thereby binding on the 
United Kingdom, whose practices must comply with Community law 
at all times. 152 
In order to insure uniform protection of CITES protected species 
in the Community, the Council Regulation required the Member 
States to withdraw their existing reservations. l53 The Regulation 
cial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223, [1947] 2 All E.R. 680 
(C.A.» 
146 See id. 
147 See Stephens, Tories to Seek Delay on Ivory Ban for HK, Financial Times, Jan. 17, 
1990, at 8, col. 2. 
148 See CITES, supra note 1, art. XV(3). 
149 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, UN Doc. AlConf. 
39/27; 63 AJIL 875 (1969). Article 19 of the Vienna Convention provides that reservations 
may be formulated unless they are incompatible with the purpose of the treaty. Id. art. 19(c). 
150 Commission Regulation No. 3626/82, O.J. L 384/31 (1982) [hereinafter Commission Reg-
ulation]. 
161Id. 
162 On the relationship between European Community law and English law, see HARTLEY, 
supra note 115; WYATT & DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 25-50 (2d ed. 
1987). 
163 See Commission Regulation, supra note 150. 
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did not specifically order withdrawal, but the Commission of the 
European Communities twice has stated that "no reservations shall 
be entered with regard to any species included in the Convention's 
Appendices, and existing reservations by Member States shall be 
withdrawn before entry into force of the Regulation. "154 Because the 
African elephant already was listed in 1984 it is arguable that the 
United Kingdom reservation might be considered to fall within the 
Commission's statement prohibiting reservations. 
Additionally, Articles 19 and 20 of the Council Regulation provide 
that any question relating to the application of the Regulation shall 
be examined by a Committee consisting of Representatives of the 
Member States. 155 The implication of this provision is that such a 
Committee would have the final word, subject to review by the 
Commission and, ultimately, by the European Court of Justice, on 
matters of compatibility of reservations with the Regulation. Faced 
with this argument, the Government of the United Kingdom likely 
would argue that because the European Economic Community 
Treatyl56 does not apply to the colony of Hong Kong, the Regulation 
does not apply to it and therefore a Committee thereunder would 
not have jurisdiction over Hong Kong. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the United Kingdom res-
ervation could have the effect of making the United Kingdom as a 
whole, as well as Hong Kong specifically, a "State not a Party" to 
CITES with respect to ivory.157 If the Committee were to review 
the reservation pursuant to the Council Regulation, then it arguably 
might find jurisdiction according to such a literal reading of the 
Regulation, the Commission's statements, and Article XV(3) of 
CITES. 
The United Kingdom reservation opened a regrettable technical 
loophole in the operation of the ban on trade in ivory. Inevitably, it 
was left to a PINGO to scrutinize the legality of a Party's actions 
because the other Parties apparently did nothing to respond formally 
to the United Kingdom reservation. Whatever the result of possible 
legal challenges by Greenpeace or others may be, the attention 
focused on the United Kingdom's conduct may cause significant 
154 See Commission of the European Communities, INF. Doc. FROM THE COMMISSION: THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CITES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, at 1, cited in Thomsen & 
Brautigam, supra note 107, at 275 n.34. 
155 See Commission Regulation, supra note 150, arts. 19-20. 
156 Treaty on the Establishment of a European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
V.N.T.S.3. 
157 See supra note 130. 
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enough public pressure to guarantee that the reservation will not be 
extended beyond the initial six-month duration. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The highly contested decision to ban international trade of the 
African elephant and the reservations subsequently taken exemplify 
the difficulties of constructing an effective international regime to 
conserve and protect endangered species, especially if the species 
also has commercial value. More significantly, perhaps, the entire 
episode highlights the increasing and crucial role played by the non-
governmental actor in the international arena: participating in the 
decision-making process, monitoring and implementing the Conven-
tion, and, where possible, enforcing an effective interpretation of 
the law. 
